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1. Introduction
In this paper a three—country model based on intertemporal
maximizing behavior is constructed in order to analyze the effects
of oil price increases on welfare levels and trade balance positions.
The model can also be used to assess the effects of oil price in-
creases on the world interest rate, on the final goods terms of trade
between oil importers (what is sometimes called the real (external)
exchange rate), and on output, investment and savings levels, oil
imports, wages, and consumption at each date.
The theoretical interest in these effects is derived, of course,
from the substantial oil price increases that have occurred over the
last eight years, the resulting large surpluses in OPEC's trade
balances, the corresponding overall deficits in the rest of the world
vis—à—vis OPEC, and the differential macroeconomic adjustment among
oil importers.
There is by now an extensive literature on the macroeconomic
effects of oil price increases. However, this literature mostly
relies on a static, small economy analysis that keeps world interest
rates and traded goods prices fixed following an oil price increase.
Such a partial—equilibrium and non—intertemporal approach is limitingand could be misleading. Moreover, such a single—economy framework
cannot be used to study the differential responses of oil importers
to oil price increases.'
Three—country world equilibrium models have recently been constructed
by Schrnid (1980) and Sachs (1980) ,butthey differ considerably from the
one developed here. Schmid's model of OPEC and two OECD oH importers
is within the monetary—approach—to—the—balance—of—payments tradition and
lacks an explicit treatment of the intertemporal choices involved in
saving and investment behavior that are so crucial to what we think is
a proper analysis of the current account response to oil price increases.
In fact, there is no capital accumulation in his model nor is there a
role for the world interest rate. In addition, he assumes that both
oil importers produce the same final goods, and so ignores the expendi-
ture—switching effects from relative price changes induced by oil price
increases.
Sachs' model of OPEC and two industrial oil importers, on the
other hand, is intertemporal in nature and gives an important role
to capital accumulation and the world interest rate in the macro-
economic adjustment process. However, his model is not used to
examine changes iii welfare levels and relative trade positions that
result from oil price increases. Moreover, it is too complicated to
solve analytically, and is instead examined by simulation methods.
The two—period three—country model developed below is
analytically tractable and easily manipulated and interpreted. It
relies on the dual approach, characterized by the use of expenditure
and GDP functions. Such an approach is formally equivalent totraditional ones which use utility and production functions, but it
has some practical advantages, among them notational simplicity. Our
way of applying the dual approach has been very much inspired by
Dixit and Norman (1980).
The model is used primarily to isolate the determinants of changes
in welfare levels and of changes in trade balance positions when there
are oil price increases. It shows that welfare levels are influenced
by direct oil terms of trade effects, final goods terms of trade effects
and intertemporal terms of trade effects. Relative trade balance
positions among oil importers are influenced by these same terms of
trade effects and also by a consumption—wealth effect and substitution
effects in consumption and investment.
The model also highlights the role of structural asymmetries
between oil importers in accounting for differences in trade balance
responses. A number of structural differences are isolated in turn
in order to determine their influence on the final goods terms of
trade, which is the key factor in affecting relative trade balance
positions.
it is shown that oil price increases can worsen the relative
trade position of the more oil dependent importer by deteriorating
its final goods terms of trade. Oil price increases also cause a
final goods terms of trade deterioration for the oil importer with
the larger net creditor or smaller net debtor position in the first
period, for the oil importer with more flexible wages in the first
period, and under plausible conditions, for the oil importer with
the smaller marginal propensity to save. Finally, oil price increasesdeteriorate the final goods terms of trade of the oil importer with
the smaller degree of substitutability in oil and can hence worsen
its relative trade position.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The three—country
modelis set outin Section2. in Section 3, worldequilibriumis
defined.The effects of an oil price increase on welfare levels,
trade balances, world interest rates, and the relative price of final
goods are derived. Section 4 analyzes in turn the role of five
structural asymmetries which influence the final goods terms of
trade and hence the relative trade balance response of oil importers.
These structural asymmetries are (1) the degree of oil dependence,
(2) the net creditor or debtor position, (3) the marginal propensity
to save, (4) the employment response and (5) the degree of substi-
tutability in oil. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2. The home country, the foreign couittiy and OPEC
Considera world of three countries in anintertemporalframework.
Call the three countries the home country, the foreign country and
OPEC. There are two dates, indexed t=1and 2.
At date 1 three goods are produced:(1) home final goods, produced
exclusively in the home country, (2) foreign final goods, produced
exclusively intheforeign country, and (3) oil, produced exclusively
in O1'EC .Atcha te2, two goods are roduced : a common f maIgoodis
producedin the home and foreign countries,2and oil in OPEC. Imported
oil is used as an input in production in the home and foreign countries.
It is neither consumed nor stored.At date I the non—OPECcountriesconsumehomeand foreign goods
They can also use their own—produced good for investment purposes in
order to increase their capital stocks at date 2. To capture the lag
in OPEC consumption of its oil revenues, we invoke the extreme
assumption that there is no OPEC consumption at date At date 2
all three countries consume final goods.
All three countries can trade goods on the world market at each
date. They also have access to a coirnuon world credit market.
OPECoxoqenousiy sets oilprices in terms of borne goods at date
1 and in terms of final goods at date 2. The price of foreign goods
in terms of home goods and the home goods rate of interest are
endogenously determined.
letus now examine the behaviorof thhome country,modeling first
its production side. Let x =ft(ktitzt) denote its well-behaved
concave production function at date L, where x is output of home goods,
kt the home country's capital stock, 2 its employment level, and z its
input (import) of oil. The representative firm operates competitively.
It is then convenient to represent the production side by means of
the revenue, or GDP, functions,5 yt(p, Qt kt, zt) defined as
(2.1) yt(pt Qt kt, pt) =maxtPxt —Qt1t:X=ft(ktjt x)},
where and Q1 are the nominal spot prices of home goods and oil
at date 1, measured in some arbitrary unit of account, and P =P2
and Q2 are the nominal spot prices of final goods and oil at date 2.
Throughout the rest of the paper we shall use home goods as the
numeraire at date 1 and final goods as the numeraire at date 2, and6
we shall hence normalize P P2 =1.Welet qt=QI /P11 represent Liiidite1
oilpricerelative to home goods at date 1 and q2= Q2/P2 represent the date 2
oil price relative to final goods at date 2. Then, yt(1, qt, kt, t)
is GDP, or national value added, measured in home goods at date 1
and final goods at date 2.
We use standard properties of GDP functions to express home goods
supply, the home country's import of oil and its demand price for
labor as
t t t t t t
(2.2)x =Y, z =—Y, w
1 q
where Y, Y,Y
and denote the partials of the GDP function
(Y denotes yt/p), and w represents the date t wage relative to
home goods at date 1 and relative to final goods at date 2.
With respect to employment, We assume that labor is fixed in total
supply within the home country. Initially, flexible wages ensure a
given full employment level, at each date. The full—employment
assumption will be relaxed in Section 4.4.
.JiLiirv;1ectto cai tal ,thehome coun-Liy
'c
jiLal stock at date
1, k1, is predetermined and exogenously given. Its capital stock at
date 2, k2, can be augmented by investment of home goods at date 1, i.
Thus
(2.3) k2 =k1+ i1
At date 2 there is rio investment.
We can derive the home country's investment function in the following
manner. We denote the home goodsdiscount factor by ó which is7
identicnl to I/(1+ r),wherer Ithe home goods rrite of interest.
The homecountry's investment (demand) function, 11(1, ,q2,k1, 9), is
then, under competitive conditions, given by the level of investment that
maximizes the difference between the present value of GDP at date 2 and
the cost of investment at date 1,i.e., the solution to the problem
(2.4) max {Y2(l, q2, k1 + i,)-l}
.1
1
The investment function hence fulfills the first—order condition
(2.5) 6Y(l, q2, k1 + I'(l,,q2, k', 2),2) =1
which says that firms invest up to the point wherethe present
valueofthe marginal product of capital in date 2 production equals
the price of capital goods at date 1.
To examine the properties of the investment function, we differentiate
(2.5) ,whichgives the derivatives
=-/ kk >







where Yq =2Y2/q2k2, kk =2Y2/a(k2)2,and I = etc.
The derivative I is positive, since by theconcavity of the8
2. CDP func t ion in the capital stock the second order part ial'kk
negative. Thepartial I is negativeif capital and oilare com-
plements. Similarly, the derivative I is positive if capital andlabor
are complements. Throughout we shall assume that capital and oil, and
capital and labor, are indeed complements. This is so if the production
function fulfills the non—restrictive condition that all its cross
partials f, f, and f are positive.6
Letus nextconsider thehome country's Ucrnand side.Weassume
thatthe home country can be represented by a well—behaved utility
function U(c1, 4,c2),where c, 4,c2are the home country's
consumption of home goods and foreign goods at date 1 and of final
goods at date 2. Households seek to maximize utility subject to the
constraint that present—value expenditures do not exceed present—value
7 income. Define the corresponding (present value) expenditure function
as





where 4isthe nominal spot price of foreign goods at date I,
and D is the nominal discount factor, equal to one overone plus
the nominal rate of interest. The expenditure functiongives
the minimum present value of expenditure on consumption required
to reach a target utility level, u, at given prices.
Choosing date 1 home goods as numeraire, letting the relative
price of foreign goods in terms of home goods be denoted byp,
where p =P/P(the real exchange rate), and recalling that thehome goods discount factor 6 is equal to DP2/P,wecan use
the linear homogeneity property of the expenditure functioii to
write (2.7) as E(l, p, 6, u), the present—value of expenditure
on consumption measured in date 1 home goods.
Astandard property of the expenditure function is that its partial
with respect to the price of a good equals the Hicksian compensated
demand function for that good. Hence
(2.8)c =E,c=Eand c =E
h 1 f p
(S
whereE ,UandEdenote thetartialsof theexpenditure function.
1p
Consider next a competitive equi libriurn forthe somecountry, which
can be represented by the intrterioral budget constraint
(2.9) E(1, p, ó, u) +11(1, ô, G92)=
Y1(1,q1, Q1) +àY2(1,q2, 11(1, 6, q22) 92)
where we have suppressed the given capital stock kat date 1.
Thebudget constraints tates that tb105(5Lva I uof expenditure
onconsumption and investment equals the present value of GOP over
the two dates. It canbe understood as expressingthe welfare level
uas an implicit function of oil prices, the price of foreign goods,
the discount factor, and the employment levels.Given this
welfare level,output of final goods, oil imports and wages1 0
arcjiven by (2.2), consumptionat each date is qiven by.8) ,and
investmentis q.Lven by the investment funct ion.
The budget constraint can alternatively be written as equating the
present value of expenditure on consumption to the borne country's
wealth,W, defined as
(2.10) w= (ii-.11)+
whichis the sum of GDP at date 1, net of investment, and the present
value of GDP at date 2.
The home country's trade balances at dates 1 and 2, b1 and b2,
aredefined as
1 1 1 2 2 (2.11) b =Y—
E1—pE
—Iand b =Y—E.
From (2.9) and the homogeneity of the expenditure function it follows
that the trade balances fulfill
(2.12) b1 +ób2=0,
i.e•,tradeis balancedin presetit—valueterms over time but not
necessarily ateachdate.
Ascan be seen from inspection of (2.11), the home country's
trade surplus at date 1 is equal to GDP (Y1) minus domestic absorption
(E1 +pE+Ii)at date 1. Alternatively, the trade surplus represents
the excess of domestic saving (Y' -- pE)over investment (Ii)11
Since there is no initial debt and hence rio interust jayments at
date 1,thetrade surplus at date 1isalso equal to the current-
accountsurplusand represents the net accumulation of foreign assets.
Finally, sinceGDP at date 1 equals output, x', minus the value of oil
input, q1z1, the trade surplus can be written as exports (x1 —C1' — 1)
minus the value of imports (pc +q'z').In summary, (2.11) incorporates all
the basic definitions of the trade (current—account) balance, and each
of these measures is based on intertemporal maximizing behavior and is
determined by the same set of factors.
Let us now examine the foreign country, which behaves much like
the home country. Its variables and functions will be denoted by a
star superscript.
Theforeigncountry produces foreign goods at date 1 and
finalgoods at date 2 using capital, labor and imported oil.
*t t t*t t
Let Y(p ,q,k ,9.)denote its GDP functions, where we note that
at date 1 the first argument in the GDPfunctionis the relative price
of foreign goods. The foreign country's output, oil import and wage
rate at the two dates are given by
(2.13) x1 = (p, q1), z*1 =_Y*1(p,q'), w*1 =Y(p,q1); and
=Y*(1, q2, k*2), z2= - y*2(q2, k*2),
2 2 2 * wY (I, q ,k2)
where we have suppressed labor inputs and the date 1 capital input
due to the constant level of (full) employment at each date and
the exogenously given date 1 capital stock.12
rFhefore ign country can investforeigngoods at date 1 to increase
itscapital stock at date 2.Its investment demand function,
*1 2 *1 *2
I (p, 6 ,q,k ,9) , willfulfill
(2.14) Y2(I, q2, k*1 +T*1(p,6, q2, k*1, 9*2),9*2) p.
Thederivative of theinvestment function with respect to the price of
foreigngoodsis
(2.15) = 1/Y <0,
and the other derivatives of (2.14) are given by expressions analogous
to (2.6)
The foreign country's demand side is represented by its expenditure
function E*(l, p, 6, u*), where the consumption levels are given by
(2.16) c = E, c1 = E*, and c2 E6.
Its intertemporal budget constraint, expressed in terms of home
goods, is
p, 6, u*) +pI*1(p,6, q2) =
(2.17)
Y*1(p, q1) +6Y*2(i,q2, I*1(p, 6, q)),
where wehavesu1)ressed I abor inputs andthe(late1 cgita1 stock
Alternatively, the budget constraint can be written as equating the
foreign country's present—value expenditures on consumption to its
wealth, Wk, where'3
(2.18) =(y*1 - 1)1*)+
Theforeign country's trade balances at dates 1 and 2 are
2 2
(2.19) h*1= y*1 —E
—pE*
—[* andb*=Y*—
whichby (2.17) and the homogeneity of the expenditure function fulfill
'2 2" *1 *2 • h +6b =0.
Finally, let us examine OPEC. Weassume that OPEC exogenously
1 2
setsoil rices q and q and supplies the quanLity nf oil in each
period which will satisfy world (home and foreign) demand at the
announced oil prices. OPEC production of oil requires negligible
resources.No final goods production takes place in OPEC.All OPEC
consumptionis confined to date 2. Denoting OPEC variables with an
uofl superscript,wecan write OPEC's intertcmporal budget constraint
as
o2 lot 202 0 (2.21) =qx +óqx =W
wherec2 is OPEC's consumption of final goods at date 2, and x1 and
x2 are the outputs of OPEC oil at the two dates, which are equivalent
to the oil imports of the home and foreign countries at the two dates.
Hence, the present value of OPEC's consumption equals the present value
of its oil production, i.e. OPEC's wealth, W°.14
OPEC'sImdc hal nnces atthetwo dates aregivenby
(2.22) hO]qlxOl>0and b02q2x02 -C < 0,
which by (2.21) fulfill
(2.23) b01 +6h°2=0.
3.World EquilibriumandOil Prices Increases
In a world equilibrium, the oil market and final goods markets
are in equilibrium at each date. The complete model is described by
equations (3.l)—(3.8):
E(1, p, 6, u) +11(1,6, q2) =
(3.1)
=Y1(1,q1) +6Y2(1q2, I(1, 6,
E*(t, p. 6, u*) +pI*1(p,6, q2)
(3.2)
1 1 2 1 2 =y*(p, q )+ 6YZ(1, q, 1* (p, 6, q )),
o2 1 ol 2 o2
(3.3) 6c =qx +6qx
(3.4) z1(l, q1) +z*1(p,q1) =
(3.5) z2(l, q2, 11(1, 6, q2)) +z*2(1,q2, I*1(p, 6, q2))x2,
(3.6) +E
+I=x1(1,q1),'5
(3.7) E + E* + 1*1x*1(p,q'), and
+
(3.8)
=x2(1,q2, 11(1, ,q2))+x2(1,q2, 1*1(p, ,
Themodel consists of the budget constraints,(3.1) —(3.3)
oil market equilibrium at dates 1 and 2, (3.4) dud (3.5), market
equilibriumfor date 1 home goods, (3.6), date 1 foreign goods, (3.7),
and date 2 final goods, (3.8)
For exogenous oil prices q1 and q2, the eight equations (3.1)-
(3.8) determine seven endogenous variables, u, u, c2, x1, x02, p
and 5.By Wairas' Law, one of the equations is redundant .We
shall disregard (3.8), the market for date 2 final goods.
The solution to (3l)—(3.8) can be substituted into (2.11), (2.19)
and (2.22) to determine the trade balances for each country. In
equilibrium, the date 1 trade balances will of course sumto zero.




ol lol b =qx ,and
(3.10) 1)1 +b*1+bOl=0.
To calculate the effects of oil price increases, dqt > 0, on
welfarelevels and trade balances with flexible wages and constant1 6
emjloymentlevis at each date, we first differentiate (3. 1) and (3.2)
whichafter some manipulations gives the change in welfare levels
in the home country and in the foreign country
I 1 2 I 2
(3.11)E du =— z dq
—zdq





Theexpressions EandE in (3.11) and (3.12) are the partials of
the expenditure functions with respect to the welfare levels; they
equal the inverse of the marginal utilities of wealth and are positive.
Let us first look at the home country's change in welfare.
We see that the change in welfare, du, is proportional to the sum
of the present value of the static oil terms of trade effects,
_ztdqt, the static final goods term of trade effect, —cdp, and
an intertemporal terms of trade effect, b do. An increase in
today's oil price has a direct negative effect on welfare. An in-
crease in future oil prices also reduces welfare. In addition, an
increase in present or future oil prices alters the relative price
of foreign goods and affects the interest rate. If foreign
goods prices should rise, the home country suffers a static terms—
of trade deterioration which reduces welfare.If the interest
rate should fail (dO >0),thehome country experiences a welfare
gain (loss) if it is a net borrower (lender) in date 1. Thus the
net impict on the home country's welfare depends in part on how oil
price increases affect foreign goods prices and interest17
rates and whether or not the country is a net borrower or lender
in date 1 .Wealso see that the degree of substitutability in
production between oil, capital, and labor has no direct (first—order)
effect on the home country's welfare.
Theexpressionfor the foreign country's change in welfare
is analogous, except that the final goods terms of trade effect
is of opposite sign.
Differentiating (3.3) gives the change in OPEC's date 2 con-
sumption (and welfare)
(3.13) 6dc02 =(xOldql+ 6x02dq2) + (qIdxOl + q2dx02) + b°2dó
OPEC's change in welfare is proportional to the sum of the static
oil terms of trade effects and an intertemporal terms of trade
effect, although with signs opposite to the sum of those for
the home and foreign countries. In addition there is an oil
quantity effect, qldxOl + 6q2dx°2, consisting of a change in the
present value of oil revenues due to the change in the home and
foreign countries' oil imports, evaluated at constant oil prices.
This oil quantity effect depends on the degree of substitutability
in production between oil, capital, and labor, which hence direct-
ly influences the change in OPEC welfare. The static oil terms
of trade effects are positive, the intertemporal terms of trade
effect may be of any sign, and the oil quantity effects are likely
to be negative.18
Let us, somewhat loosely, speak of the sum of the left hand
sides of (3.11) —(3.13)as expressing the (wealth equivalent)
changein world welfare. It is given by
(3.14) Edu +E*du*+dc02=qIdxOl+oq2dx02,
and consists of the oil quantity effect only. The terms of trade
effects are like transfers between the three countries, and they
cancel from tile world point of view. Thus world welfare falls to
the extent that the present value of the home and foreign countries'
oil imports decrease when evaluated at constant oil prices.
To determine the effect of oil price increases on tile trade
balances, we differentiate (3.9), which after some manipulations
yields


















ol ol I I ol (3.17) db =xdq +qdx
where the changesininvestment are given by
(3.18) dl' =11dq2+I'dand
q19




andwhere is the homecountry'saggregate marginal propusity to consume
at date 1(outof wealth), which is positive and less than one if
consumption is normal at both dates. The expressions Eand E
Ip pp
are its Hicksian static substitution effects on date 1 consumption
of home and foreign goods given a change in the foreign goods
price, and and E6 are the Hicksian intertemporal consumption
substitution effects, etc.
Let us first look at the change in the home country's trade
balanceat date 1 .Thereare six determinants of the trade balance
response. The first term on the right—hand side of (3.15) is a
direct oil termsoftradeeffecton date 1GDPcaused by an increase
indate 1 oil prices. An increase in today's oil prices has a
negative effect on date 1 GDP and thus worsens the trade balance.
The second term in (3.15) is the final goods terms of trade
effect; any increase in p causes a terms of trade deterioration at
home visvis the foreign oil importer and worsens the home country's
trade balance.
The third term is a consumption wealth effect caused by the change
in welfare that accompanies oil price increases, If the home country
suffers a welfare loss as a result of oil price increases, household
expenditures will fall. This drop in absorption improves the trade
balance. The bracketed expression in the second term is the wealth
equivalent of the change in the home country's welfare, given by
(3.11).20
The fourth term on the right—hand side of (3.15) represents a
date I final goods consumption substitution effect. If oil price in—
creases should raise foreign goods prices, householdswill
shift their expenditures away from foreign goods and toward home
goods. If own—substitution effects dominate cross—substitution
effects, then net expenditures will fall, improving the trade
balance.
The fifth term in (3.15) is an intertemporal consumption substitution
effect. An inc rease in the discount factor boosts house—
holdabsorptionof date 1 goods and worsens the trade balance.
The last term consists of investment substitution effects.
If the increase in oil prices lowers interest rates, invest-
ment demand is stimulated. This increase in absorption hurts
the trade balance. An increase in date 2 oil prices also alters
the marginal profitability of investment. If capital and oil are
complements in date 2 production, an increase in future oil prices
will lower the marginal product of capital. This leads to a drop
in investment demand which improves the trade balance.
It is readily seen from (3.16) that the same six determinants
affect the foreign country's date 1 trade balance. There are two
important differences in the direction of effect, however. First,
any increase in p causes a final goods terms of trade gain for the
foreign country (c dp >0)while causing a loss for the home
country. Second, an increase in p also has an effect on investment
behavior in the foreign country that is absent in the home country.21
This latter difference appears because the two countries use country—
specific capital, and it would disappear if the two countries employed
thesame capital goods in date 2.
Let us now study the endogenous changes in the
discount factor and the price of foreign goods caused by oil
price increases. Differentiating (3.6) and (3.7), making use
of (3.11) and (3.12) and manipulating, we get
(3.20)dh dhl d=
dfdfpjdPj[Sf
where on the left hand side dhó is the partial of the world excess
demand for home goods with respect to the discount factor, dh is the
partial with respect to the price of foreign goods, and df5 and
df denote the corresponding partials of the world excess demand
for foreign goods. On the right hand side, s1 is the change in the
world excess supply of bornegoodsfollowing the oil price increase,
given constant discount factor and price of foreign goods, and
Sf
is the corresponding change in the world excess supply of foreign
goods. The partials in (3.20) are given by the somewhat cumbersome
yet easily interpreted expressions22
(I}=ló+I+I+cj4b2+cb*2>O,
d1 =11p
+ + (c —cw)c
>0,
df6 = +E* + I + cwb2 + cb*2 > 0,
(3.21) df =
E+ E* + 1*1 -x*1+ (c -c)c
< 0,
Sh
x1dq1 —I'dq2+ c(z1dq1 + z2dq2)
+ c(z*1dq1 + 6z*2dq2) > 0,and
Sf =x*1dq1-I*1dq2+ c(z'd' + z2dq2)
+ c(z*1dq' + 6z*2dq2) > 0,
1 1
where Ci and CfW are the home country's marginal propensities to
consume home and foreign goods out of wealth at date 1.
We assume gross substitutability, which is sufficient for stability.
We also assume that oil price increases lead to excess supply (at
constant discount factor and foreign goods price) of both home and
foreign goods. The latter assumption holds if the negative substitu-
tion effects on output, x1dqand x*1dq1, are dominated by the other
effects, which are all positive.
The solution to (3.20) is
(3.22) (1(L(dS—(Is )IA >0 mid
fph lip f




+ + + + —23
whereA is the (leterminant
(3.24) A= (Id —dd <0. h6 fphp fó
+ — ++
The discountfactor unambiguously increases inresponseto oil
price increases. This response occurs regardless of whether the oil
1 2 1 2 price mci c restmporar '.(dq0, lq = 0)prnhincnt(iq,(1(
orexpected to occur in the future (dq'0, dq2> 0).
rI1o Jfltu] t i V'xplanatic)n is straight Forward. AL a constant cliscourt
factorand price of foreign goods, theexcesssupply of bothhome
andforeign goods at date 1 brought about by higher oil prices
implies by Wairas' Law an excess demand for final goods at date 2.
Hence the price of final goods at date 2, the discount factor, must
rise. Put differently, excess supply of both home and foreign goods
at date 1 implies excess saving at date 1, which bids down the interest
rate.
Thechange in the price of foreign goods is in general ofambiguous






Itfollows that the sign of the price change is given by
df6 Sf (3.26) sign dp =sign
(-a—-—— —•
hiS h
This expression can be nicely interpreted. The ratio (dfo/dho)
gives the relative world excess demand for foreign goods from the
change in the discount factor, at constant foreign goods prices.2/4
Theratio (s/s1) gives the relative world excess supply of foreign
goods from the oil price increases, at constant discount factor and
foreign goods price. If this relative world excess demand for
foreign goods exceeds this relative world excess supply, the price of
foreign goods must rise.
4. Differences in structure, the price of foreign goods, and
the relative trade balance response
Clearly, if the home and foreign countries are alike in every
respect, there will be no change in the foreign goods price, and the
two oil importers will have identical trade balance responses to
exogenous oil price increases. In this section we look at how
structural differences between the home and foreign countries
influence the foreign goods price response to oil price increases.
We also examine how structural asymmetries can account for differences
in the relative trade balance response.
A number of structural asymmetries can be examined in order
to assess their impact on the final goods terms of trade (p) when
there are oil price increases. We choose to focus on five which are
widely thought to be important and/or which are amenable to future
empirical testing. The five structural characteristics are (1) the
degree of oil dependence, (2) the net creditor or debtor position,
(3) the marginal propensity to save, (4) the employment response,
and (5) the degree of substitutability in production. We shall
examine the implications of each structural asymmetry in turn.
Our method will be to assume that the home and foreign countries
are identical except in one respect atatime. Let the initial25
situationbe one where the relative price of foreigngoodsequals
unity,
(4.1) p =1.
We start by assuming that the home and foreign countries have the
same bias towards their own good, in the sense that their
marginal propensities to consume home and foreign goods at date 1
fulfill
1 1 1 1
(4.2) ChW =cw> CfW=
CiW.
It follows from (4.1) and (4.2) that their aggregate propensities
to consume aL dat:e I are the same,





4.1 'fliedegreeof oil dependence
The conventional view is that oil price increases cause larger
trade balance deteriorations in those economies that are heavily
dependent on oil imports. This view has been challenged recently
by Sachs (1981), who argues that differential dependence on oil
imports has little effect on relative trade positions if the oil
price shock is perceived as permanent, but does matter if the shock
is temporary. The analysis below suggests that the degree of oil
dependence does influence the trade—balance response to all types
of oil price increases, whether temporary, permanent or future, but
that oil dependence is just part of the story.26
Suppose that the home country is more oil dependent in each
period than the foreign country, in the sense that
(4.4)z >z*for t =1,2.
The two countries are alike in all other relevant respects. That
is, we assume that
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it follows from (3.21) and (4.2) —(4.5)that
(4.6) df6 =dh
>0 and











— = 1 > 0,
dh Sb Sh
andfrom (3.26) it follows that the foreign goods price rises.
The country with the higher degree of oil dependence suffers a final
goods terms-of—trade deterioration. The intuitive reason is straight-
forward. The country with the higher degree of oil dependence faces
a greater welfare loss when oil prices rise. Consequently at date 1
the drop in demand for home goods is greater than the drop in demand
for foreign goods. The relative excess supply of home goods that
results put upward pressure on p.2/
Toexamine the relative trade balance response to oil price
increases when there is anasymmetryin oil dependence, we comhine
(3.15), (3.16), (4.1), (4.3) and(4.5)in order to write




(z1 -z*1)dq1— — z*2)dq2]
(+) (+)
1 1 1 —(1_Cii)2ccdp+pI*dp. r L p
(+) (÷)(—) (+)
Sincethe home country is more oil dependent, it faces a higher
value of oil imports when oil prices increase. This causes a negative
directeffect on the relative trade balance, represented by the first
term on the right hand side of (4.8). But the home country also
experiences a greater welfare loss when oil prices rise and hence a
greater drop in absorption. This causes a positive consumption wealth
effect on the relative trade balance, represented by the second term
on the right hand side of (4.8). The net of these two effects is
ambiguous.
Consider for a moment the effect of a temporary oil price
increase. This disturbance has a negative direct effect on the relative
trade balance and a smaller positive consumption wealth effect. Hence
the temporary oil price increase worsens the relative trade balance
for constant p.
A future oil Price increase has only a positive consumption wealth
effect and hence improves the relative trade balance for constant p. Finally,
a permanent oil price increase has both a negative direct effect and a
positive consumption wealth effect, with an ambiguous impact on the
relative trade balance for constant p.28
NowSUPOSCthatoil imports and oil price increases are the same
in both periods for each country, hut oil imports still differ across
countries.That is,
(4.9) =z2 z,z*1 == z,dq1dq2 =dq,and z >z.
Substituting (4.9) into (4.8) we see that at constant p the relative




C)/cS. If the home country's aggregate marginal
propensity to consume is the same at both dates, i.e. C =
thenpermanent oil price increases will have no effect on relative
trade positions, regardless of the asymmetry in oil dependence. This
is Sachs' (1981) story. But as soon as we relax the restrictive
assumptions in (4.9) and as soon as we allow for the endogenous
change in the foreign goods price, this strong result fails to hold.
Returning to (4.8), we see that the increase in the foreign
goods price generated by higher oil prices has three additional effects
on the relative trade balance. It has a negative direct effect, a
smaller positive consumption wealth effect (both represented by the
third term ontheright hand side of (4 .8)) and a negative investment
effect. Thelattereffect is due to the country-specific capital
used at home and abroad; an increase in p raises the cost of invest-
ment goods in the foreign country and hence reduces foreign absorption
at the first date. This investment effect worsens the relative trade
balance; however, it would disappear if both countries used the same
capital goods in production.29
Weconclude that temporary and permanent oil price increases
which worsen importers' trade balances will have graver consequences
for the relatively oil—dependent importers.
Of course, oil importers are apt to diffr in a number of
structural characteristics which influence p, so the correlation
between oil dependence and the relative trade balance response is
likely to be missed unless these other asymmetries are also taken
into account.
4.2The net creditor or debtor position
Now suppose the two oil importers are similar in all relevant
respectsexcept for their net lending positions. Specifically, we
assume
(4.11) b1 > b*1,
which by (2.12) and (2.20) implies
(4.12) b2 < b*2.
It follows that
(4.13) dh < df6and 5h =Sf.
From (3.26) and (4.13) it follows that the foreign goods price increases.
The home country, with the larger net creditor position or smaller
net debtor position in date 1, faces an additional final goods terms
of trade deterioration in response to oil price increases.
The rationale is intuitive. Oil price increases raise the
discount factor, and the drop in the real interest rate causes a30
lrger welfare loss for the home country with its larger net creditor
position in date 1.It experiences the greater negative consumption
wealth effect, so on net there will be a greater excess supply of home
goods relative to foreign goods in date 1. This puts upward pressure
on p.





(—) (+) (+) (—)(+)
Sincethe endogenous increase in the discount factor causes a
larger welfare loss for the home country in date 1, it has a positive
consumption wealth effect on the relative trade balance, represented by
the first term on the right hand side of (4.14).The endogenous
increase in the foreign goods price, i.e. the deterioration of the home
country's final goods terms of trade, has a negative direct effect on
the relative trade balance and a smaller positive consumption wealth
effect, both of which are represented by the second term in (4.14),
and a negative investment effect.Hence when
two oil importers are identical in all relevant respects except for
their net lending positions, the relative trade balance response to
oil price increases cannot be determined without knowledge of specific
parameter values.
4.3 The marginal propensity to save
Supposethat at date 1 the home country has a smaller marginal
propensity to save, and hence a large propensity to consume, than the
foreign country. Assume that the two countries still have the same31
riativbiaii(:onsum[.)tiontowark; th:ir OWn yoode represent
these assumptions by
(4.15)C = with0 << 1,and =ac
> aC.












since c > From (3.26) and (4.16), it follows that the effect
on the foreign goods price is ambiguous.
The effect of a temporary oil price increase on the foreign goods
price can be determined, however. Let Shi and s represent the change
in world excess supply of home goods and foreign goods, respectively,
given an increase in date 1 oil price alone, where from (3.21) we can
write
(4.17) Shi (x1 +cz' + cz*1)dq1
>0 and





Then from (3.26) it follows, with some manipulation, that






i.e., theforeigngoods price increases. The home country, with the
smaller marginal propensity to save, faces a final goods terms of
trade deterioration when there is a temporary oil price increase.
This is because for a given loss in welfare caused by the oil price
increase, the drop in demand for home goods will exceed the drop in
demand for foreign goods. The relative excess supply of home goods
that results puts upward pressure on the foreign goods price.
Theeffectof a future oil price increase on the foreign goods
price is indeterminate. As before, if thehome country has thesmaller
marginal propensity to save at date 1, a given welfare losswill cause
a drop in demand for home goods that exceeds the dropin demand for
foreign goods. This tends to put upward pressure on p. However, the
expected increase in future oil prices also reduces investment demand
for date 1 goods, releasing more of them for date 1 consumption. With
the smaller marginal propensity to save, the home country will
experience the smaller excess supply of domestic goods when investment
demand is curtailed. This puts downward pressure on p. Only if this
investment effect is dominated can we say the oil importer with the
smaller marginal propensity to save date 1 goods will suffer a final
goods terms of trade loss when there are future oil price increases
or current oil price increases of a permanent nature.
When the two oil importers differ only in their marginal propen-
sities to save at date 1, the relative trade balance response is given
by










Oilprice increases have a direct negative effect on welfare
(—z1dq1—óz2dq2<0)in both countries. Since the home country
has the smaller marginal propensity to save, it will respond with a
greater cut in absorption and this will have a positive effect on the
relative trade balance, represented by the first term on the right
hand side of (4.19). The endogenous increase in the discount factor
will have a positive effect on welfare in hoth countries since both
have the same trade deficit in date 1. But the home country, with
its larger marginal propensity to consume, will respond with a
greater increase in absorption, and this will have a negative effect
on the relative trade balance, represented by the second term in
(4.19). If the net welfare effect is negative, oil price increases will
have a positive effect on the relative trade balance for constant p.
Since the change in the foreign goods price can be in either direction,
we cannot determine its effect on the relative trade balance. Con-
sequently, when two oil importers are alike in all relevant respects
except for their marginal propensities to save, we cannot calculate
the relative trade balance response to oil price increases without
knowing specific parameter values.
4.4 The employment response
So far we have assumed flexible wages and full employment at each
date in the home and foreign countries. In this section we shall
examine the consequences of rigid wages and variable employment at
the first date in the home country. We maintain the assumption of
flexible wages and full employment at the first date in the foreign
country, and in both countries at the second date.14
Lct us now I uok atemploymentinthehome count ry at date1
First,suppose that the wageis fixed in terms of home goods at the
first date, i.e., wages are indexed to the GDP deflator. The level
of employment is then given by the condition that the demand price
for labor, Y, equals the wage. Hence, the date 1 employment function,
L (w ,q,k),isdefined by
(4.20) Y(l, q', k1, L1(1, q1, k1)) =w1,
where w1 is the wage in terms of datehome goods.
Differentiating (4.20), we get the derivatives






where the second order derivative Y is negative by the concavity
of the GDP function. Hence employment at date 1 is always a decreasing
function of the real wage, a decreasing function of the oil price at
date 1 by the assumption of complementarity between oil and labor,
and an increasing function of the capital stock by the assumption of
complementary between capital and labor. With real wages fixed in
terms of home goods at date 1, the change in the home country's date 1
employment level in response to an oil price increase will hence be
given by
(4.22) d =L1dq10,
ie employment at date 1 decreases.35
Withthe endogenous change in the home country's employment given
by (4.22), its welfare change in (3.11) is modified to
(4.23) Edu w1 d -z1dq1—6z2dq2—
cdp+ b2d
where d$ is given by (4.22). The change in welfare now includes a
negative employment effect, w'd2J, the change in GDP due to the change
in employment.











+ pE o)d6 -dl'.
The changes in excess supplies of home and foreign goods are now
given by
(4.25) s =xd9+ x1dq1I1dq2 + c(— w1dZ1 + z1dq1 ÷ óz2dq2)
*1 *1 1 *2 2
+ ci(z dq + z dq ),and
Sf =x'dq1—I1dq + c(- w'dZ' + z1dq1 + z2dq2)
+ c(z*1dq1 + z*2dq2).
Assuming that the home and foreign countries are alike in all
relevant aspects except for the employment response, we have
(4.26) dh6 =d1> 0 and




(ch—cfl.) w }d2, < 0,
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whichsays that theforeigngoods price falls.
Sinceoilprice increases cause a drop in the home country's
employment level at date 1, there is a greater drop in the production
of home goods relative to the production of foreign goods. The
relative excess supply of foreign goods which results puts downward
pressure on p. Consequently, the oil importer with rigid real wages
experiences a final goods terms of trade gain when there are oil price
increases. This effect is counter to the negative employment effect.
Which effects dominates depends, of course, on the specific parameters.
The relative trade balance will be given by
(4.28) db1 —db*1=(1—C)w1d -(1—
C)2cdp
+pI*1dp
(+) (-) (+) (-)(- (-)
where(4.28) is the difference between (4.24) and (3.16).
When wages are rigid in the home country, oil price increases
reduce employment and cause a bigger drop in home GDP relative to
foreign GDP. This causes a negative direct plus consumption—wealth
effect on the relative trade balance, represented by the first term
on the right hand side of (4.28). The improvement in the home country's
final goods terms of trade causes a positive direct plus consumption—
wealth effect on the relative trade balance, given by the second term
in (4.28), and a positive investment effect. Consequently there is no
direct correlation between the degree of wage rigidity and the response
of the relative trade balance to oil price increases.Consider nexta casewhere thedalei wage in the home country
is fixed intermsof aconsumerprice index (CPI) rather than in
homegoods. Let denote this given real wage, in terms of the
CPI. Let the price index u1(l, p) denote the date 1 CPI, in terms
ofhome goods. [tisa function of the price of home goods (normalized to
unity) and the price of foreign goods (p).Then the wage in
terms of home goods will be a function, w1(l, p. w1), defined by
(4.29) w1(i, p, w1) =ir'(l,p)w1.
It has theobviousproperties
111 w =ir >0 and
p p
(4.30)
I I w =it> 0.
(U
Thewage in termsof home goods is an increasing function of the price
offoreign goods and the CPI wage rate.9
Inthis case,the home country's employment level at date 1will
simplybe given by L1(w1(l, p, Wi), q', k'), i.e. by substituting the
wage function (4.29) into the employment function defined in (4.20).
It follows that the change in employment will be given by
(4.31) d2L1dq1 +L1w1dp0.
(—) (—) (+)
Inaddition to the direct effect of an oil price increase, there is
now an effect through the change in the wage rate. Should the foreign
pricefall, ilie wagein home goods falls, and thisincreases employment.
Hence,the overall effect of an oil price increase on employment
is now ambiguous.
By the same argument as above it can indeed be shown that the
foreign goods price does unambiguously fall. (di1 in (4.25)and(4.26)38
is simply replaced by L1dq1.) If Ihen the overall change in employment
is positive, we see that both the employment effect and the fiiial
goods terms of trade effects on home welfare are positive in (4.23).
Also, the relative trade balance in (4.28) is unambiguously positive.
Does it follow that it is always better for the home country to
have the wage fixed in terms of a CPI rather than in home goods? No,
since with wages fixed according to a CPI, the supply of home goods
is more elastic with respect to the price of foreign goods. Uence
the fall in the foreign goods price is smaller with given CPI wages
than with given home goods wages. Thus the final goods terms of trade
gain is smaller with CPI wages, although the employment effect is
less negative or even positive.
4.5 The degree of substitution
Suppose that the two oil importers are identical in every relevant
respect except for the degree of substitutability in production betweeti
oil and domestic capital and labor. We assume that the home country has
less such substitutability at date 1 so that it experiences a smaller
absolute response in the full employment level of output of home
goods to an oil price increase. That is, we assume
(4.32) x*1 <x1<0,
q q





Sh —Sf(Xq —x*)dq >0.By (3.23) and (4.33) we can write
(4.34) dpdho(sf — >O
(+) (—) (—)
whichsays that the foreign goods price increases. With a given level
of employment and capital stock utilization in each country at date 1,
the home country, with the smaller degree of substitutability in oil,
faces a smaller decline in production at date 1.The relative excess
supply of home goods that results puts upward pressure on p.hence,
the country with less substitutability in production suffers a final
goods terms of trade loss.
The relative trade balance response is




Thedeterioration in the home countryts final goods terms of trade
has a negative direct plus consumption—wealth effect on the relative
trade balance, represented by the first term on the right hand side of
(4.35), and a negative investment effect. Hence oil price increases
worsen the relative trade balance response; the oil importer with the
smaller degree of substitutability in oil suffers a greater negative
effect on its trade balance.
5. Conclusion
This paper represents the first attempt in the literature to
construct an explicitly intertemporal three—country model in order
to analyze the effects of oil price increases on countries' welfare40
levels and relative trade balance positions. The model uses aggregates
which are consistent with maximizing behavior and yields a rich array
of analytically tractable results.
For instance, the determinants of changes in welfare levels
and of changes in trade balance positions when there are oil price
increases are readily isolated. Changes in output levels, oil
imports, investment, employment, wages, saving and consumption can
also be calculated for individual oil importing countries. The
three—country world equilibrium model also takes account of the
feedback effects of higher oil prices on the world interest rate and
the final goods terms of trade between oil importers (the real exchange
rate).
One important finding is that structural asymmetries between
oil importers cause oil price increases to alter the final goods
terms of trade in systemmatic ways, and these movements in the final
goods terms of trade play a crucial role in determining an oil
importer's relative trade balance position in the face of oil price
increases. Despite some recent thought to the contrary, the degree
of oil dependence does influence a country's relative trade balance
position. So does a country's degree of substitutability in oil.
Other structural characteristics, such as a country's relative
international lending position, its relative marginal propensity to
save, and is degree of wage flexibility in the short run also
alter the final goods terms of trade in predictable ways and influence
an oil importer's relative trade balance position.
In short, the model presented here allows us to analyze some41
important general equilibrium interrelationships in detail and to
study the differential macroeconomic adjustment of oil importers
to oil price increases.L2
Footnotes
* Weare grateful to the semi ar participants at the NBER Summer
Institute in International Economics, and at the Institute for Inter-
national Economic Studies, University of Stockholm for their helpful
comments. We especially want to thank Torsten Persson and Michael.
Schmid, who have contributed specific comments, some of which have
been incorporated. We of course retain sole responsibility for
remaining errors.
I. For partid. equilibrium analyses of effects of oil price increases
that emphasize intertemporal aspects, see Bruno (1981), Marion (1981),
Obstfeld (1980), Sachs (1981), and Svensson (1981). Dixit (1981) presents
a very neat intertemporal general equilibrium model of trade in goods,
capital,and oil,hutconcentrates onothe r Issues than those ofthe
presentpaper.
2.The assumption of a common final good at date 2 greatlysimplifies
theanalysis and makes possible intuitive explanations of the results
to follow. It is also warranted since we are mainly interested in
the date 1 final goods price and relative trade balance responses.
Precise conditions on the countries' preferences and/or technologies
can also be found under which home and foreign goods at date 2 could
be rigorously aggregated into one aggregate final good at date 2.
See Svensson and Razin (1981) and Svensson (1981) for such analyses
applied to the study of trade balance responses.
3.What is necessary for the results below is the reasonable assumption
that OPEC's marginal propensity to consume at the first date is smaller
than that of the home and foreign countries. Assuming that there is4
zero OPEC consumption at the first date however greatly simplifies
the analysis.
4.For the implications of an endogenous OPEC policy that maximizes
OPEC welfare, or of an OPEC policy which sets oil prices at each date
in terms of date 2 final goods, see Marion and Svensson (1981, in progress).
5.The GDP function is also called the value—added, the restricted
profit, the variable profit, the GNP, or the revenue function. A compre-
hensive reference is Bruno (1978) or Diewert (1974) .SeeVarian (1978)
for a micro—textbook using this and similar dual functions, and Bruno
(1973), Chipman (1972), Dixit and Norman (1980), Khang (1971), and
Woodland (1981) for their use in international trade theory.
6. Note that complements in this sense is not a very restrictive
assumption. This definition of complements/substitutes is different
from the ones usually employed in the literature. Complements!
substitutes are mostly defined, in analogy with the definition of Hicksian
complements/substitutes in consumption, from the sign of the partial
of the demand for a factor with respect to the price of another factor,
at constant output level. See Berndt and Wood (1979) for a thorough
discussion of such Hicksian complementarity/substitutability between
oil and other factors. Factors can be Hicksian substitutes and yet
complements in our sense. This is indeed the case with the specific
separable technologies discussed by Berndt and Wood, when
x =f(g(k,e), h(9., m)), f(•), g(•) and h(.) are linearly homogenous,
e is energy input, and m is input of non—energy materials.44
Afrequently assumed technology is one that is weakly separable in
oil and a capital—labor composite factor. Then wehavexf(v(k, ),z),
wheref(.) and v(.) are linearly Iioruogcnous.itisreadily checked that
for these technologies, capital, labor and oil are complements in our
sciisc.
7. SeeDeatonandIucl1bauer (1980), Diewert (1974), Dixit and Norman
(1980),Varian(1978),or Woodland(1981) for properties and uses of the
expenditurefunction.
8.The assumption of gross substitutability imp ics that d> 0
Iij)
andd <0,that is, an increase in the price of foreign goods raises
fp
the world excess demand for home goods and reduces the world excess
demandfor foreign goods. Similarly, it implies d >0and (I >0.
hó
9.By standard properties of a price index, p/ equals the share
of final goods in date 1 consumption expenditure.
10. Assume that date 1 production of home goods is separable between
an aggregate of domestic capital and labor, v(k, 2),andoil input, z.
That is, the production function fulfills x =f(k,,,z) g(v(k, Z), z).
Note that if g(•) and v(•) are constant returns tø scale, so is f(•).
In particular, with this technology, frequently assumed in the literature,
capital, labor and oil are all complements in the sense of having positive
cross partials.
With full employment of labor, only x and z vary. By standard
A
resultswe have x =Ozand z—yq,where x denotes therate of change
dx/x, etc., 0 is the cost share of oil in the value of output of home
goods, and -y (defined positive) is the elasticity of demand for oil45
with respect to the relative oil price. Furthermore, y equals o/(l —0),
where o is the elasticity of substitution between oil and the domestic
aggregate factor v. Hence, we have x —[01(1—O)]crq,and it follows
that for a given oil price increase and a given output level, the
absolute response in output is smaller the smaller the elasticity of
substitution.46
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